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ABSTRACT
Databases in the past have helped businesses maintain and
extract insights from their data. Today, it is common for
a business to involve multiple independent, distrustful par-
ties. This trend towards decentralization introduces a new
and important requirement to databases: the integrity of the
data, the history, and the execution must be protected. In
other words, there is a need for a new class of database sys-
tems whose integrity can be verified (or verifiable databases).
In this paper, we identify the requirements and the design
challenges of verifiable databases. We observe that the main
challenges come from the need to balance data immutabil-
ity, tamper evidence, and performance. We first consider
approaches that extend existing OLTP and OLAP systems
with support for verification. We next examine a clean-slate
approach, by describing a new system, Spitz, specifically
designed for efficiently supporting immutable and tamper-
evident transaction management. We conduct a preliminary
performance study of both approaches against a baseline
system, and provide insights on their performance.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Traditional database systems are indispensable for busi-
nesses.They excel at storing, processing, and performing an-
alytics over business transactions. Recent digital optimiza-
tion and transformation have enabled businesses to transact
directly with each other, without relying on a central party.
As a result, multiple parties can access a shared database.
Since the parties are mutually distrustful, the underlying
database must consider support for auditing, tamper evi-
dence, and dispute resolution in its design. For instance,
it must maintain a trusted data history and allow users to
verify the integrity of both current and historical data.
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Blockchains demonstrate one practical design for database
systems with strong integrity [21]. Public blockchain sys-
tems, such as Ethereum, support secure peer-to-peer ap-
plications through smart contracts. Private blockchains,
such as Hyperledger Fabric, target business settings and
achieve higher performance than public ones. Blockchains
have drawn interests from banks and regulators, with the
prospect of offering digital currency and digital banking.
Combined with recent advances in 5G, AI and IoT, block-
chains are expected to speed up the transformation and fur-
ther disrupt the e-commerce and financial industries.
To make a database that can be accessed by potentially
malicious parties trustworthy, it must be verifiable. A veri-
fiable database system protects integrity of the data, of its
provenance, and of its query execution. More specifically,
any tampering such as changing the data content, changing
a historical record, or modifying query results, can be de-
tected. We note that the demand for verification is on the
rise due to the requirements imposed by the regulators on
various business sectors, investment and banking in partic-
ular.
The first requirement in the design of a verifiable database
(VDB) is data immutability, which is necessary for main-
taining trusted provenance. Immutability means data is
only written once and never deleted. It is not a new con-
cept. It has been used in NoSQL systems such as HBase [4],
CouchDB [1] and RethinkDB [8] to achieve more efficient
concurrency, due to the fact that no synchronization of ac-
cesses is needed. It is also used in Resilient Distributed
Datasets (RDDs)[9] for lineage and fault tolerance. The
second requirement of a verifiable database is query verifi-
ability. It means the query results contain integrity proofs
for both the data and query execution. More specifically, a
user can detect if either the data or the query execution has
been tampered.
In this paper, we discuss four challenges in realizing the
design of verifiable databases. The first challenge is in stor-
age management, as data immutability requires managing
the ever-increasing volume of data. Consider a typical health-
care analytic application, in which health data needs to be
kept for the lifetime of a patient, and each diagnosis, lab test,
prescription, etc., is appended to the patient profile. Disease
and procedure coding standards evolve over time, e.g., from
ICD-9-CM to ICD-10 in recent years. Such changes in clas-
sification and coding standards require updates or mapping
onto the existing medical record. To ensure good data prove-
nance, the data must be immutable and a new version of the
database, i.e., a snapshot, is appended. The data volume is
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Figure 1: Data storage improved by deduplication.
increasing with time, and therefore its management needs
to be efficient and reliable. Let us consider another exam-
ple where an immutable database stores 10 WIKI pages of
16 KB each initially. We create a new version when updat-
ing a page, while keeping the previous versions. Figure 1
shows the space utilized with an increasing number of ver-
sions. Clearly, the space utilization increases substantially
with the number of immutable versions, and the use of an
efficient multi-version storage engine such as ForkBase [51]
helps to reduce it. This highlights the importance of storage
efficiency for a database that is forever increasing in size.
The second challenge is to provide efficient access methods
for querying immutable data. While some existing database
systems archive historical data and support temporal query
processing, they have not been designed to support “perma-
nent” immutability. In VDB, data is never deleted; query
processing and frequent searching on older versions of the
data will be prohibitively expensive if efficient storage lay-
out and indexes are not supported. This may entail scan-
ning of a substantial portion of the database for answering
verification queries.
The third challenge is to minimize performance overhead
of verification. VDB must generate integrity proofs whose
cost can be significant. Blockchains, for example, have poor
transaction throughput due to their protocols for guaran-
teeing security in the Byzantine environment. The perfor-
mance gap between traditional databases and blockchains is
significant due to their different design focus. As a result, a
verifiable database must adopt a hybrid blockchain-database
approach in order to strike a better balance between perfor-
mance and security.
The fourth challenge is the need to support both OLTP
and OLAP workloads, as illustrated by the emergence of
HTAP database systems. The former requires serializabil-
ity which is important for applications such as e-commerce.
Most existing OLTP systems adopt optimistic concurrency
control (OCC), instead of pessimistic concurrency control,
because of its simplicity and high performance. In contrast,
analytic queries in OLAP do not require the strict ordering
provided by serializability. Existing OLAP systems adopt
multi-version concurrency control (MVCC) to achieve data
consistency with high performance. Most existing works on
verifiable queries focus on OLTP workloads. While general
OLAP queries can be made verifiable, for example by using
fully-homomorphic encryption, they involve complex cryp-
tographic operations and incur significant overhead [40, 47].
Financial
Transactions
Logistic
Orders
Medical
Records
Verification Digital Token
Transferring
Credit
Reports
Verifiable 
Database  System
Verifiable Data Structure
Multi-version StoreKey-Value Store Row Store Columnar Store
Version
Management
E-commerce
Events
Figure 2: Verifiable database system overview.
Therefore, it is challenging to support both verifiable OLTP
and OLAP queries with practical performance.
In addition to the four challenges above, we note that
VDB must also aim for deployability. It is often costly
to either add a new database system into an existing in-
frastructure, or to replace an existing database with a new
one. In particular, for a business with consolidated soft-
ware stacks, data conversion is necessary to move data to
the new database. Furthermore, users may find the system
difficult to use if the verifiable database adopts unfamiliar
programming models or interface.
In this paper, we discuss two approaches to realize an
efficient VDB. The first approach is to extend existing sys-
tems, and the second is to design a new system from scratch.
Figure 2 shows the second approach and how it fits with
existing business applications. The new system uses tamper-
evident structures for verification, and efficient version man-
agement for performance.
We make the following contributions in this paper:
• We identify the requirements and design challenges of
efficient verifiable databases.
• We discuss two approaches for realizing an efficient ver-
ifiable database: by extending existing systems, and a
new clean-slate design called Spitz.
• We perform an experimental study on Spitz and com-
pare it with a baseline. The results show that Spitz
can achieve good performance, despite overhead from
verification and additional data structures.
• We discuss various future research topics, including the
integration of learning methods onto VDB and version
management of the machine learning pipeline.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we present existing works and systems that are re-
lated to VDB processing. In Section 3, we discuss the re-
search challenges and opportunities of VDB. We next de-
scribe the challenges in the approach of extending existing
OLTP and OLAP system to implement VDB in Section 4.
In Section 5, we present the system architecture of Spitz. We
then present an experimental study in Section 6, and com-
pare our systems against a baseline implementation based
on a commercial service. We discuss the promising synergy
between VDB and AI in Section 7, before concluding in Sec-
tion 8.
2. VERIFIABLE DATABASES
In this section, we survey existing works and systems with
verification features.
2.1 Verifiable Database
Data integrity is important in outsourced database as
third-party service providers can be malicious. In partic-
ular, applications running on top of an outsourced database
require the data and query results from the providers to be
verifiable, that is, tampering of data and query execution
can be securely detected. One way to achieve verifiabil-
ity is using verifiable computation techniques. Benabbas et
al. [16] present a delegation scheme on verifiable database
minimizing the resources required by the clients of verifiable
database. Guo et al. [25] improve the update efficiency using
a long polynomial for public keys and a short polynomial
for private keys. Miao et al. [36] enable efficient keyword
search for VDB using enhanced vector commitment while
HVDB [65] supports hierarchical verification by building a
vector commitment tree. SNARKs [40] can support arbi-
trary computation tasks, but requiring an expensive setup
phase, and incurring significant overhead. Ben-Sasson et
al. [15] improve upon SNARKs by bounding the complexity
of the setup phase to size of the database and the query com-
plexity. More recently, Zhang et al. [63] propose a system
called vSQL that uses an interactive protocol to support ver-
ifiable SQL queries. However, vSQL is limited to relational
databases with a fixed schema.
Another way to achieve verifiability is by using authenti-
cation data structures such as Merkle trees. Li et al. [29]
propose and evaluate authentication index structures com-
bining Merkle trees and B+-trees. Yang et al. [57] propose
integrity-protected MR-tree for spatial data. ServeDB [54]
proposes a Merkle tree index based on hierarchical cube en-
coding that supports efficient multi-dimensional queries. Se-
curity conscious applications enforce data integrity against
malicious modifications not only from external attackers,
but also from malicious insiders and cloud hosting opera-
tors. As a solution, SUNDR [30] cryptographically protects
all file system contents and proposes a fork consistency pro-
tocol to detect data tampering.
More recent systems, namely VeritasDB [49] and Con-
certo [14], leverage trusted hardware to speed up verifica-
tion. In particular, both store Merkle tree data inside SGX
enclaves. Veritas stores the roots of the trees, and Concerto
uses memory verification technique to avoid contention in-
side the enclaves.
2.2 Out-of Blockchain Database
Blockchains, which was originally designed for cryptocur-
rencies, is now being used as a general-purpose transac-
tional system. Being a distributed data processing system, a
blockchain system shares some similarities with a distributed
database system. However, its focus is security, whereas the
database’s focus is performance. The design space of both
systems can be viewed along four dimensions: replication,
concurrency, storage and sharding. A recent work [45] pro-
vides an extensive and in-depth comparison of blockchain
versus database. It shows that along the four design dimen-
sions, different choices lead to different performance. We are
seeing a trend of merging these two systems into a design
that is secure, efficient, and can be readily adopted by ap-
plications such as logistic, digital banking, and digital asset
management.
One step toward realizing a hybrid blockchain-database
is to support rich data queries on blockchains [22, 35, 43,
10]. A simple approach is to join the network as a full node
and then execute the query. However, running a full node
is expensive. vChain [56] addresses this problem by em-
bedding an aggregate and constant-size authentication data
structure, constructed with multiset accumulator, in each
block header. This allows users to run a light node to query
with integrity guarantee. TrustDBle [23] proposes a secure
and scalable OLTP engine that provides verifiable ACID-
compliant transactions on shared data using trusted hard-
ware.
BlockchainDB [22], Veritas [24], FalconDB [42], and Lin-
eageChain [44, 46] are recent systems that use blockchain as
a verifiable storage and add database features on top of it.
We now discuss these systems in more detail.
BlockchainDB adopts a simple key-value data model, and
exposes Put/Get/Verify operations to clients. It consists
of a database layer and a storage layer. The former con-
trols the consistency level of requests so that clients can
choose the balance of result staleness and performance. The
storage layer serves as the unified interface to the under-
lying blockchains. It translates requests from the database
layer into blockchain transactions and monitors the trans-
action status. When a client invokes Verify, a blockchain
node would contact other peers to check whether the corre-
sponding transaction is committed in the ledger. A node in
BlockchainDB does not hold the complete copy of the state.
Instead, the states are partitioned to multiple blockchains.
Veritas shares a similar goal and vision with BlockchainDB,
but differs in three aspects. First, it targets complex data
models, i.e., relational model. Second, it employs Trusted
Execution Environments (TEEs) such as Intel SGX as the
trustable verifiers that consume the database logs for the
transaction validation. The validation results, in the form
of verifiers’ votes, are persisted in the blockchain. As a re-
sult, when there is a dispute, any party can resolve it by
reconciling the database log with the votes on the ledger.
Third, Veritas does not support partitioning, as it does not
store all states on the blockchain.
Instead of checking the ledger for log validation, FalconDB
organizes database records into an authenticated data struc-
ture, such as a Merkle tree, which enables a succinct in-
tegrity proof on a database record. FalconDB employs an
incentive model allowing clients to selectively challenge the
transaction results from a suspicious server. If the server
cannot provide proof of correctness, it will be penalized.
FalconDB also supports authenticated queries on a tempo-
ral data model, so that users may access data snapshot with
respect to a particular block.
LineageChain [44, 46] is a fine-grained, secure, and effi-
cient provenance system built on top of ForkBase [51, 32]
and FabricSharp[3]. It provides provenance information to
smart contracts through simple interfaces to enable a new
class of blockchain applications whose execution logics de-
pend on provenance information at runtime. LineageChain
captures provenance during contract execution and stores it
in a Merkle tree implemented in ForkBase, and provides a
novel skip list index to support efficient provenance queries.
2.3 Ledger Database
Amazon offers Quantum Ledger Database (QLDB) [11],
a cloud service that provides data immutability and verifi-
ability. QLDB consists of blocks organized in a hash chain
called journal. Changes to the data, including insert, update
and delete, are collected into blocks and appended to the
journal. A Merkle tree is built upon the entire journal. To
support efficient query, the journal is materialized to user-
defined tables for the latest data and history data. QLDB
aims to provide the high performance of database systems
with integrity guarantees for data and historical data ver-
sions. Similarly, Oracle Blockchain Table [13] offers append-
only verifiable tables by implementing a centralized ledger
model. MongoDB [12] supports verifiable change history by
storing document collections in a hash chain.
Datomic [2] is a distributed immutable database system
designed to be ACID compliant, with datom as its database
building block. It is a form of key-value store, and Datoms
are collected to form an entity. It makes use of key-value
stores such as Amazon DynamoDB for managing the data,
and allows users to obtain a historic snapshot of the database
via its APIs and query language. Immudb [6] is a recently
released immutable tamper-evident open source database
system. Due to the demand for VDB, we foresee active
development in such kind of database systems. However,
with no deletion, the database size will grow over time, and
query processing efficiency and scalability could become ma-
jor concerns.
3. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
In this section, we discuss the research challenges in im-
plementing an efficient VDB. In particular, the requirements
of immutability and verifiability have implications on stor-
age and indexing, query verification, and concurrency con-
trol mechanisms. We discuss the methodologies from recent
works that provide building blocks for VDB.
3.1 Storage and Indexing
VDB requires an immutable and tamper-evident storage
engine. In particular, the storage must support integrity
proof generation, and have an efficient version management
mechanism.
ForkBase [51], a storage with Git-like version control and
branch management, and Merkle-based directed acyclic graph
(DAG) data structure, provides a good starting point. Fork-
Base supports collaborative analytics, and content-based data
deduplication mechanism that significantly reduces data vol-
ume in the physical storage. Furthermore, it supports effi-
cient version querying.
As in traditional databases, indexes are necessary for fast
retrieval and location of records. Recent Merkle tree-based
indexes, namely Merkle Patricia Trie (MPT) [53], Merkle
Bucket Tree (MBT) [5], and Pattern-Oriented-Split Tree
(POS-Tree) [51], support efficient queries on immutable data.
[59] contains a comprehensive analysis of these indices, show-
ing that MPT, MBT, and POS-Tree are different instances
of Structurally Invariant and Reusable Indexes (SIRI) [51],
and that POS-tree has better overall performance. In ad-
dition to these indices which are designed for query verifi-
ability, other indices are needed to further speed-up data
retrieval. Since versions can be modeled as temporal or his-
torical data, indexes such as the historical R-tree[37], and
rolling index Bx-tree [26] could be adapted to support the
multi-dimensional and single-dimensional queries. We envi-
sion that the need for fast querying of historical data will
lead to new, innovative indexes.
3.2 Verification
Query verifiability in VDB means that the user who sends
the query can verify the integrity of the result, that is the
data and execution have not been tampered with. We dis-
cuss here different approaches to achieve verifiability.
Client-side verification vs Server-side verification.
When the data is outsourced to a third party, the users
themselves must verify some proofs provided by the third
party. However, verification can be expensive for the users,
especially when running on low-power devices. Trusted hard-
ware, such as Intel SGX, can help mitigate this cost for user,
by supporting server-side verification. In particular, the
hardware performs verification securely at the servers, by
running verification inside trusted execution environments,
and output only succinct proofs that can be verified cheaply
by the user. However, the secure hardware has limited re-
sources that can lead to significant performance overhead.
Furthermore, existing secure hardware are vulnerable to side-
channel attacks that compromise their security.
Online verification vs Deferred verification. With
respect to the timing of the verification, there are two ap-
proaches: online, and deferred verification. In the former,
the data must be committed after the verification succeeds,
which is useful when recovery from malicious tampering is
costly. In the latter, verification is done over a batch of
transactions, therefore achieving higher throughput than the
former.
Verification via encryption. One way to protect data
integrity is by using authenticated encryption. Users can
encrypt data using private key and store the ciphertexts
on untrusted storage. Data tampering can be detected di-
rectly with the authentication tag. The limitation of this
approach is that it restricts computation (or queries) on the
ciphertexts. Encryption schemes with various support for
computation on ciphertexts exist, but they have trade-off in
security and computation. All of these schemes have signif-
icant performance overhead.
Verification via authentication data structure. Au-
thentication data structures, which are based on Merkle
trees, provide data integrity with low cost. In this struc-
ture, the leaf nodes contain cryptographic hashes of the data
blocks, while the non-leaf nodes contain the hashes of their
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Figure 3: Non-intrusive design.
child nodes. The hash of the root node is called the “digest”
of the data. The integrity proof consists of the hashes of the
nodes from the corresponding leaf to the root of the tree.
The new digest is recalculated recursively and equality is
checked with the previously saved digest.
3.3 Concurrency Control
Many outsourced or cloud databases are multi-tenant.
Applications running on top of a multi-tenant database may
require different ACID isolation levels. The database of-
ten has fixed the transaction isolation levels at the time of
deployment, therefore applications have to implement their
own levels for their needs, which increases the complexity of
the system. This problem can be mitigated by using per-
tenant database architecture, but this approach does not
scale well.
Consider as an example an e-commerce system with cus-
tomer credits. On the one hand, the purchases of the items
must occur in sequence to prevent double spending or ship-
ping out-of-stock items. In other words, the transaction
schedule needs to be serializable, which can be implemented
using optimistic concurrency control (OCC) or multi-version
concurrency control (MVCC) with abortion on read-write
conflicts. On the other hand, the analysis report or sta-
tus checking on the system may not require strict isolation.
Such queries are mostly processed as read-only workloads,
and many of them require near real-time responses. For
example, read committed isolation will be sufficient to ex-
ecute query “getting all items with stock-level lower than
50”. In this case, it is unnecessary to abort the query when
read-write conflicts occur.
A common approach to achieving high performance for
weak isolation is to fix the isolation to a weak level (e.g.,
read committed), and implement customized logic to han-
dle stricter level in the applications. Such design involves
locks, checking pre-images of data and sometimes reversions,
therefore complicating the application logic and incurring
large overhead. By providing flexible isolation levels in the
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Figure 4: Intrusive design.
underlying database, it allows for performance optimization
and lets users focus more on the application logic.
4. EXTENDING OLTP/OLAP TO VDB
VDB can be implemented by adding a verifiable ledger
to an existing database system. The ledger supports im-
mutable data and verifiable queries. Here we discuss the
challenges of integrating such a ledger to OLTP and OLAP
systems.
There are two designs for integration, as shown in Fig-
ure 3 and Figure 4. The blue arrows, rectangles and cylin-
ders depict a typical data processing flow, where the data is
collected by OLTP and analyzed by OLAP systems.
Non-intrusive design. As shown in Figure 3, a ledger is
attached without modifying the architecture of the original
database systems. However, additional steps are added dur-
ing transaction processing. The OLTP and OLAP systems
generate integrity proofs from an independent ledger. On
the one hand, this design minimizes disruption to existing
systems, as it does not require changes to existing data. On
the other hand, it incurs considerable performance overhead,
due to the interaction with the ledger.
Intrusive design. Another design, as depicted in Fig-
ure 4, is to embed the ledger into an existing database sys-
tem. This eliminates communication with an outside ledger,
by generating the integrity proof inside the database. While
reducing performance overhead compared to the other de-
sign, it incurs significant cost in data migration. In particu-
lar, data must be moved to the new system, which may be
too costly for users with large amounts of data.
Another approach is to integrate the ledger with a hy-
brid transactional/analytical processing (HTAP) system. A
HTAP system is designed to unify efficient processing of op-
erational and analytical workloads in the same database. In
the HTAP system, no data migration from OLTP system to
OLAP system is necessary. Existing OLTP systems are be-
ing converted to HTAP by exploiting in-memory processing
[61] and both columnar and row storage structures. Some
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recent NewSQL systems also adopt HTAP in their design
and implementation.
5. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we discuss the system architecture of Spitz,
a distributed database designed from scratch that supports
both OLTP and OLAP workloads with verifiable ledgers.
As shown in Figure 5, the system consists of two layers: the
control layer, and the storage layer.
The control layer consists of multiple processor nodes that
accept and process requests from a global message queue1.
Each node has three main components: a request handler,
an auditor, and a transaction manager (TM). The request
handler accepts query requests and returns the results with
the corresponding proofs. The auditor communicates with
the ledger in the storage layer to keep track of data changes.
The transaction manager controls the execution of the queries
in the storage.
The storage layer features a distributed storage engine,
namely ForkBase. Built on top of ForkBase is a virtual
cell store, as opposed to row or column store in traditional
databases. The system maps each cell to a universal key
consisting of the column id, primary key, timestamp, and the
hash of its value. There are multiple index structures built
into the storage layer to support verifiable query processing.
1Similar to other distributed systems, the coordination, as
well as the resource management, is done by a master node.
Ledger. This structure consists of a sequence of hashed
blocks. Each block tracks the modification of the records,
query statements, metadata and the root node of the in-
dexes on the entire dataset. The block and the data can be
verified using the Merkle tree structure built on top of the
entire ledger. Section 5.3 discussed more details regarding
verification and proof generation.
Index. Spitz uses a B+-tree for query processing. The
input of the index is the requested keys, and the output is
the matched data cell. This structure is efficient for both
point and range queries.
Inverted Index. When processing analytical queries,
the system uses an inverted index to quickly locate the rows
to fetch data. Such an index uses the value recorded in each
cell as index key and the universal key of the correspond-
ing cell as value. The structure of the inverted list varies
according to the type of the data stored in the cell. For
instance, for numeric type, the system uses a skip list to
better support range query, whereas for string type, it uses
a radix tree to reduce space consumption.
5.1 Query Processing
The processor nodes handle both read, write, and mixed
workload. Spitz supports both SQL and a self-defined JSON
schema.
Write workload. There are four steps in handling a
write workload. (1) The request handler collects a transac-
tion from the message queue. (2) The auditor checks the
write operations and updates the ledger. The ledger records
the changes and returns a proof to the auditor. (3) The pro-
cessor traverses the B+-tree index and performs the write
operations to the cell store. (4) The processor collects the
results, combines them with the proof, and sends back to
the user through the request handler.
Read workload. The processing of read workload fol-
lows similar steps. (1) The request handler receives a trans-
action from the message queue. (2) The processor collects
the results by traversing corresponding inverted indexes and
retrieving the cell store. (3) The processor visits the ledger
via the auditor, getting the proofs of the results. The proof
generation is done by the ledger using the universal keys
and the internal nodes of inverted index. (4) The processor
combines the results and the proofs as responses and the
request handler returns them to the user.
Spitz uses a HTAP design to overcome the data movement
between OLTP and OLAP systems. Similar to the intrusive
design in Figure 4, it requires users to replace the underly-
ing database systems, which might be highly tangled with
their business. However, it should be highlighted that Spitz
can be used as an individual ledger by solely waking up the
auditor in the processor. Thus, the system can be applied
into a non-intrusive design shown in Figure 3 as a short-
term transition plan of integrating Spitz into the real-world
business. Ultimately, users should use Spitz as a standalone
and complete database system to cover and develop their
business.
5.2 Concurrency Control
Concurrency control in each processor node can be imple-
mented in the same way as in traditional database systems.
However, in our design, cells are multi-versioned. There-
fore, to achieve serializability guarantee, concurrency control
mechanisms based on MVCC, including MVCC with 2PL
[18], MVCC with timestamp ordering (T/O) [17], MVCC
with OCC [31], are more suitable.
Since each processor node processes transactions indepen-
dently, it is necessary to keep the data in the indexes and
the virtual storage consistent across different nodes. The so-
lution is to add distributed transactions to each node, and
follow the two-phase commit (2PC) protocol to coordinate
each transaction so that transactions committed by different
nodes can be made serializable. The challenge in achieving
serializability in distributed setting is to figure out the order
of transactions in the equivalently serial schedule.
One approach to achieving serializability is to rely on a
global timestamp service, like Timestamp Oracle [41], to
allocate the timestamps upon a transaction starts and com-
mits. We then order transactions based on their start times-
tamps. In the prepare phase of 2PC, each transaction with
read/write and write/write conflict with this order will abort.
However, there are two limitations. First, the timestamp al-
location service can become the bottleneck. Second, the
abort rate can be high in a write-intensive workload. To
address the first limitation, we can adopt the hybrid logic
timestamp scheme that allocates timestamps by each indi-
vidual node and still has serializability guarantee [28, 50].
For the second limitation, it is possible to adopt the com-
bination of OCC and MVCC by dynamically adjusting the
transaction order to reduce abort rates [19, 34], and ver-
ifying the transactions in batch to reduce the verification
cost [20]. These approaches need further investigation and
evaluation.
5.3 Proof and Verification
Spitz offers timely detection of malicious data tampering
by using an authentication data structure, namely the ledger
shown in Figure 5. Clients can use the digest of the ledger
to perform verification locally. Since changes to ledger are
serializable, during the transaction processing, only the data
committed before the transaction can be verified. After the
processing, clients can get the data and the proof of this
transaction as described in Section 5.1, along with other
metadata of the authentication tree structure if applicable.
To verify the correctness of the results, clients can recal-
culate the digest with the received proof and compare it
with the previous digest saved locally. If they match, it
means the data has not been modified during the period be-
tween the verification and when the digest is generated. To
improve verification throughput, we use a deferred scheme,
which means the transactions are verified asynchronously in
batch.
6. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
In this section, we describe the prototype of Spitz and
present its preliminary evaluation results. The full-scale im-
plementation of Spitz is in progress and a thorough perfor-
mance study will be conducted in the future.
6.1 Implementation
First of all, we implement a baseline system to emulate a
commercial product based on the features described online
and testing provided by the website. The newly inserted or
modified records are collected into blocks and appended to a
ledger implemented by a Merkle tree. The ledger is used for
verification purposes, shadowing the nodes of a typical B+-
tree for query key searching. Furthermore, the appended
blocks are materialized to indexed views for fast query pro-
cessing. To perform a read query, users can directly fetch
the data with meta information using the indexed views,
which can be verified against the ledger.
For the prototype of Spitz, we modify the latest version of
ForkBase and forgo irrelevant functionalities such as branch
management. In particular, we implement the ledger by
adopting index from Structurally Identical and Reusable In-
dexes (SIRI) family for both query and verification. Each
block in the ledger stores a historical index instance, natu-
rally composing a version of the ledger, and the nodes be-
tween instances can be shared, benefiting from SIRI prop-
erties.
For comparison purpose, we also build an immutable key-
value store (KVS) using ForkBase. It is the same as Spitz in
terms of indexing, except that it does not maintain a ledger
or provide verifiability. Therefore, by comparing the two
systems, we can focus on the maintenance and verification
cost of the ledger storage implemented in Spitz.
6.2 Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of the systems with read-
only and write-only workloads. The number of records,
which consist of different key-value pairs, vary from 10,000
to 1,280,000. The length of the key ranges from 5 to 12
bytes while the size of the value is 20 bytes. The experi-
ments are conducted on a server with Ubuntu 14.04, which
is equipped with 6 cores Intel Xeon Processor E5-1650 pro-
cessor (3.5GHz) and 32GB RAM.
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Figure 6: Basic operations in single-thread setup.
6.2.1 Basic Operations
We first evaluate the performance of read-only and write-
only workloads in a single-thread setup. We vary the initial
database size from 10,000 to 1,280,000 records, and execute
read-only and write-only workloads on different systems.
Figure 6(a) shows the results for read-only workloads.
The immutable KVS performs the best without maintaining
any verifiable data structures. The baseline implementation
and Spitz have comparable performance when the number
of records becomes large, as the index traversal becomes a
dominant factor in query processing. When the verification
on the integrity of the queried results is enabled, plotted
as Spitz-verify and Baseline-verify in the figure, the read
performance for Spitz is approximately half of that with-
out the verification while the baseline operations per second
drops by almost two orders of magnitude. If compared di-
rectly, Spitz achieves 7x operations per second than that
of the baseline. The major reason of such phenomenon is
that Spitz can store the proofs of the results and the value
of the target nodes in a unified index, namely the ledger
implemented via SIRI. To compare, the baseline needs to
visit the B+-index first, and uses the resultant nodes to get
the proof from the ledger. Figure 6(b) shows the results for
write-only workloads. Similarly, thanks to the unified index
structure, Spitz has operations per second comparable to
the immutable KVS with and without verification while the
performance of the baseline system is much worse because
of maintaining multiple indexed views.
6.2.2 Range Query
In this section, we evaluate the performance of analyti-
cal workloads with range queries. Such workloads are com-
monly submitted by data scientists to retrieve a group of
records for analysis or further aggregation. We initialize the
database with 10,000 to 1,280,000 records for different runs.
The selection conditions of the range query are set on the
primary key and the selectivity of the query is fixed at 0.1%.
Figure 7 depicts the operations per second in all systems.
As can be seen, the performance of the range query is worse
than the performance of point query shown in Figure 6(a)
by 25% to 90% for all cases. This is due to the additional
nodes needed to be traversed and scanned when the query
is processed. Meanwhile, the operations per second drops
fast when the total number of records increases because the
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Figure 7: Range query performance.
systems fetch increasing number of records with fixed selec-
tivity for all cases.
The baseline stores the ledger and the index of the data
separately, and hence, the retrieval of the proofs cannot ben-
efit from the optimizations used in range query processing.
That is, the retrieval on the proofs of resultant records, in-
stead of being fetched in a batch by scanning keys with the
given interval, must be processed by searching the digest in
the ledger individually. In contrast, for Spitz, thanks to the
use of the unified index structure described in Section 6.2.1,
proof retrieval can leverage the traversal on the index of the
data – the proofs of the resultant records are returned si-
multaneously when the resultant records are scanned and
selected. Consequently, for queries with verification of data
integrity enabled, Spitz outperforms the baseline by up to
two orders of magnitude, a gap much larger than the results
shown in Figure 6(a).
6.2.3 Non-intrusive Design vs Spitz
In this section, we evaluate the performance of a non-
intrusive design of VDB and compare it with Spitz. We
set up an immutable key-value store using ForkBase as the
underlying system, which interacts with the ledger shown
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Figure 8: Non-intrusive design vs. Spitz.
in Figure 3.2 To support data verification, we deploy Spitz
on the same server as the Ledger database in the figure. In
the case of read workloads, the client obtains the queried
results from the underlying database and the proofs from
the ledger as responses, while in the case of write workloads,
the submitted data are committed in both the underlying
and ledger database atomically. To verify the results, the
client uses the proof from the Ledger database, calculates
the digest of the returned results, and compares it with the
previous digests as described in Section 5.3.
The experiment is conducted with read-only and write-
only workloads and the results are shown in Figure 8. As can
be seen, the non-intrusive design incurs significant overhead
by maintaining two systems, i.e., the underlying database
and the Ledger database. Specifically, for read-only work-
loads, the performance of Spitz is 6x higher than the non-
intrusive design when the verification of data integrity is
enabled. The huge performance gain comes from a sim-
pler process flow: the request can be processed within a
single system in Spitz, while in the non-intrusive design,
it must be sent to the underlying database first to obtain
the results, and passed to the Ledger database to retrieve
the proofs. Obviously, the interactions between the Ledger
database and the underlying database inevitably introduce
additional cost on network communication, query planning,
etc. For write workloads, Spitz produces 3x higher number
of operations per second than the non-intrusive design.
In summary, the results show that the prototype of Spitz
achieves better performance than the non-intrusive design.
Without doubt, its performance could further be improved
with indexes and optimization strategies specifically designed
for VDB.
7. AI AND VDB - A SYNERGY
We have discussed the design and implementation of a
VDB that can support new database applications. This new
trend in database coincides with the rapid development of
artificial intelligence (AI). AI has been proven successful in
a wide range of applications, could automate many tasks,
2ForkBase can be treated as a HTAP system here therefore
we do not initialize separate OLAP and OLTP system as
shown in the figure.
and it is often better at modeling complex situations than
humans.
To meet the demand for complex analytics, database sys-
tems have enabled the addition of machine (or deep) learning
libraries to construct end-to-end analytics pipelines. With
the evolution of dataset due to versioning, machine learning
models used in the analytics pipeline may exhibit concept
drift behavior, which causes the model to become less accu-
rate over time. Therefore, iterative analytics component up-
dates may become necessary, and the relationship between
component and data versions need to be maintained for ver-
ification on the analytical results.
From system performance perspective, deep learning can
be used to enhance database performance and usability, and
vice versa, deep learning can benefit from the efficient data
management and performance provided by databases (Apache
SINGA [38] for example). Earlier works [52] have discussed
the symbiotic relationship between databases and machine
learning. In the following, we shall continue this discussion
by making a case for the merging of VDB and AI.
7.1 AI for VDB
AI can make VDB more intelligent. Currently, VDB de-
sign is based on empirical methodologies, which might not
have a good performance. As pointed out in [52], AI may
help to improve VDBs performance in several aspects.
• Learning-based data structure. A number of solutions
investigate how to enhance existing indexes or design
new indexes for better storage and query efficiency,
e.g., learned B+tree [27], secondary index [55].
• Learning-based transaction management. AI could be
used to predict the future transaction workload [33]
and schedule the transactions such that the through-
put is maximized with an acceptable abort rate [48].
• Learning-based performance tuning. To avoid man-
ual tuning of the memory allocation or I/O control,
recent works [62] apply reinforcement learning to au-
tomatically tune database configurations according to
workload changes.
• Learning-based query optimization. To optimize the
queries, existing works [39, 58] deploy deep neural net-
works such as convolutional neural networks (CNNs),
Figure 9: Verifiable federated analytical query pro-
cessing.
recurrent neural networks (RNNs) and their variants
to estimate the cardinality and cost.
Though many learning-based techniques for general DB
have been proposed, more effort is needed to adapt them
for VDB, since VDB has different data structure, storage
and transaction management requirements.
7.2 VDB for AI
VDB can make AI (-based analytics) more reliable. One
key feature of VDB is that it maintains historical data.
Hence, a natural question might be: can VDB support an-
alytical queries? For example, a client (e.g., a hospital) has
already outsourced its database to a cloud hosting company
for processing online transactions (e.g., medical records).
It may then also want the VDB to process some analyti-
cal queries (even some machine learning model) for specific
evaluations, such that it does not need to download the data
and execute locally. However, the analytical query support
in VDB is limited (e.g. [7]). More importantly, the analytics
result should be verifiable, ensuring that it is computed from
correct data; otherwise, it may result in a wrong decision,
and lead to huge loss (e.g., could be peoples health or even
life in medical domain).
There are several works [64, 63] that support verifying
arbitrary SQL queries over outsourced databases, but with
low performance. Recent works [56, 60] on verifiable specific
queries over blockchain (can be viewed as a special kind of
VDB) are relatively efficient, but they only support range
queries. It is necessary to investigate how to efficiently com-
pute complex analytical queries on VDB.
Finally, it is possible to consolidate multiple clients VDB
to provide federated analytics (as illustrated in Figure 9).
For example, a few hospitals want to have a more precise
and comprehensive analysis of a disease. The integrity of
the data and queries are important in these use cases. At
the same time, each client should not be able to break the
confidentiality of the other clients data.
In summary, AI and VDB could benefit from each other:
AI could improve the performance of VDB, and VDB could
ensure the trustworthiness of the analytical results (or AI
models).
8. CONCLUSIONS
With recent digital optimization and transformation, more
and more businesses are transacting directly with each other.
The current pandemic further speeds up the transformation
and adoption of online business processes. This trend in-
troduces a new important requirement to database systems:
the integrity of the data, the history, and the execution must
be protected. This gives rise to a new class of database
systems that support the verification of the transactional
integrity.
In this paper, we discuss the requirements and challenges
of verifiable databases. We present approaches to extend ex-
isting systems to support verification, and an initial design
and prototype of our ongoing development of a new VDB
system called Spitz. We conduct an experimental study
and show that Spitz is able to provide a better performance
than a baseline system. As future works, we will continue
to implement the system and present a comprehensive sys-
tem design and a thorough performance study. We will also
study and possibly introduce new indexes, concurrency con-
trol mechanisms and query processing strategies for VDB.
Acknowledgments
Meihui Zhang would like to thank the VLDB Endowment
Awards Selection Committee for the 2020 VLDB Early Ca-
reer Research Contribution Award, and the nominators for
the nomination. After checking with the Chair of the Awards
Selection Committee on the invited paper requirements, Mei-
hui decided to report an ongoing system development, which
is being built upon system components and works developed
by her and collaborators. For the works that led to the
award, Meihui would like to thank her mentors, colleagues,
collaborators, research assistants and students for their con-
tributions. Meihui would also like to thank her ex-dean,
Prof. Heyan Huang and current dean Prof. Guoren Wang,
for their support and guidance.
For this paper, Meihui, Zhongle, Cong and Ziyue would
like to thank Anh Dinh, Qian Lin, Wei Lu, Beng Chin Ooi,
Pingcheng Ruan, and Yuncheng Wu for their discussions,
contributions and proof reading. The research of Cong Yue
and Zhongle Xie are supported by Singapore Ministry of Ed-
ucation Academic Research Fund Tier 3 under MOEs official
grant number MOE2017-T3-1-007.
9. REFERENCES
[1] Couchdb. https://couchdb.apache.org/.
[2] Datomic. https://www.datomic.com/.
[3] Fabricsharp. https:
//www.comp.nus.edu.sg/~dbsystem/fabricsharp.
[4] Hbase. https://hbase.apache.org/.
[5] Hyperledger. https://www.hyperledger.org.
[6] immudb. https://github.com/codenotary/immudb.
[7] Querying your data - amazon quantum ledger
database (amazon qldb).
https://docs.aws.amazon.com/qldb/latest/
developerguide/working.userdata.html.
[8] Rethinkdb. https://rethinkdb.com/.
[9] Spark. https://spark.apache.org/.
[10] Wolk SwarmDB–decentralized database service for
web3. https://laptrinhx.com/wolk-swarmdb-
decentralized-database-services-for-web3-
4011398543/, 2017.
[11] Amazon quantum ledger database (qldb).
https://aws.amazon.com/qldb/, 2019.
[12] Implementing cryptographically verifiable change
history using mongodb.
https://github.com/mongodb-labs/ledger, 2020.
[13] Oracle blockchain tables. https:
//docs.oracle.com/en/database/oracle/oracle-
database/20/ftnew/oracle-blockchain-table.html,
2020.
[14] A. Arasu, K. Eguro, R. Kaushik, D. Kossmann,
P. Meng, V. Pandey, and R. Ramamurthy. Concerto:
A high concurrency key-value store with integrity. In
Proceedings of the International Conference on
Management of Data, SIGMOD, pages 251–266.
ACM, 2017.
[15] E. Ben-Sasson, A. Chiesa, E. Tromer, and M. Virza.
Succinct non-interactive zero knowledge for a von
neumann architecture. In Proceedings of the 23rd
USENIX Security Symposium, pages 781–796.
USENIX Association, 2014.
[16] S. Benabbas, R. Gennaro, and Y. Vahlis. Verifiable
delegation of computation over large datasets. In
Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2011, volume
6841, pages 111–131. Springer, 2011.
[17] P. A. Bernstein and N. Goodman. Multiversion
concurrency control - theory and algorithms. ACM
Transactions on Database Systems, 8(4):465–483,
1983.
[18] P. A. Bernstein, V. Hadzilacos, and N. Goodman.
Concurrency Control and Recovery in Database
Systems. Addison-Wesley, 1987.
[19] C. Boksenbaum, M. Cart, J. Ferrie´, and J. Pons.
Certification by intervals of timestamps in distributed
database systems. In Tenth International Conference
on Very Large Data Bases,VLDB, pages 377–387.
Morgan Kaufmann, 1984.
[20] B. Ding, L. Kot, and J. Gehrke. Improving optimistic
concurrency control through transaction batching and
operation reordering. PVLDB, 12(2):169–182, 2018.
[21] T. T. A. Dinh, R. Liu, M. Zhang, G. Chen, B. C. Ooi,
and J. Wang. Untangling blockchain: A data
processing view of blockchain systems. IEEE
Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering,
TKDE, 30(7):1366–1385, 2018.
[22] M. El-Hindi, C. Binnig, A. Arasu, D. Kossmann, and
R. Ramamurthy. Blockchaindb - A shared database on
blockchains. PVLDB, 12(11):1597–1609, 2019.
[23] M. El-Hindi, S. Karrer, G. Doci, and C. Binnig.
TrustDBle: Towards trustable shared databases. In
Third International Symposium on Foundations and
Applications of Blockchain, 2020.
[24] J. Gehrke, L. Allen, P. Antonopoulos, A. Arasu,
J. Hammer, J. Hunter, R. Kaushik, D. Kossmann,
R. Ramamurthy, S. T. V. Setty, J. Szymaszek, A. van
Renen, J. Lee, and R. Venkatesan. Veritas: Shared
verifiable databases and tables in the cloud. In 9th
Biennial Conference on Innovative Data Systems
Research, CIDR, 2019.
[25] Z. Guo, H. Li, C. Cao, and Z. Wei. Verifiable
algorithm for outsourced database with updating.
Cluster Computing, 22:5185–5193, 2019.
[26] C. S. Jensen, D. Lin, and B. C. Ooi. Query and
update efficient b+-tree based indexing of moving
objects. In Proceedings of the Thirtieth International
Conference on Very Large Data Bases, VLDB, pages
768–779. Morgan Kaufmann, 2004.
[27] T. Kraska, A. Beutel, E. H. Chi, J. Dean, and
N. Polyzotis. The case for learned index structures. In
Proceedings of the International Conference on
Management of Data, SIGMOD, pages 489–504.
ACM, 2018.
[28] S. Kulkarni, M. Demirbas, D. Madeppa,
A. Bharadwaj, and M. Leone. Logical physical clocks
and consistent snapshots in globally distributed
databases. In The 18th International Conference on
Principles of Distributed Systems, 2014.
[29] F. Li, M. Hadjieleftheriou, G. Kollios, and L. Reyzin.
Dynamic authenticated index structures for
outsourced databases. In Proceedings of the
International Conference on Management of Data,
SIGMOD, pages 121–132. ACM, 2006.
[30] J. Li, M. N. Krohn, D. Mazie`res, and D. E. Shasha.
Secure untrusted data repository (SUNDR). In 6th
Symposium on Operating System Design and
Implementation (OSDI), pages 121–136. USENIX
Association, 2004.
[31] H. Lim, M. Kaminsky, and D. G. Andersen. Cicada:
Dependably fast multi-core in-memory transactions.
In Proceedings of the International Conference on
Management of Data, SIGMOD, pages 21–35. ACM,
2017.
[32] Q. Lin, K. Yang, T. T. A. Dinh, Q. Cai, G. Chen,
B. C. Ooi, P. Ruan, S. Wang, Z. Xie, M. Zhang, and
O. Vandans. Forkbase: Immutable, tamper-evident
storage substrate for branchable applications. In 36th
IEEE International Conference on Data Engineering,
ICDE, pages 1718–1721. IEEE, 2020.
[33] L. Ma, D. V. Aken, A. Hefny, G. Mezerhane, A. Pavlo,
and G. J. Gordon. Query-based workload forecasting
for self-driving database management systems. In
Proceedings of the International Conference on
Management of Data, SIGMOD, pages 631–645.
ACM, 2018.
[34] H. A. Mahmoud, V. Arora, F. Nawab, D. Agrawal,
and A. E. Abbadi. Maat: Effective and scalable
coordination of distributed transactions in the cloud.
PVLDB, 7(5):329–340, 2014.
[35] T. McConaghy, R. Marques, A. Mu¨ller, D. D. Jonghe,
T. McConaghy, G. McMullen, R. Henderson,
S. Bellemare, and A. Granzotto. Bigchaindb: A
scalable blockchain database. Whitepaper, 2018.
[36] M. Miao, J. Wang, S. Wen, and J. Ma. Publicly
verifiable database scheme with efficient keyword
search. Information Sciences, 475:18–28, 2019.
[37] M. A. Nascimento and J. R. O. Silva. Towards
historical r-trees. In Proceedings of the ACM
Symposium on Applied Computing, SAC, pages
235–240. ACM, 1998.
[38] B. C. Ooi, K. Tan, S. Wang, W. Wang, Q. Cai,
G. Chen, J. Gao, Z. Luo, A. K. H. Tung, Y. Wang,
Z. Xie, M. Zhang, and K. Zheng. SINGA: A
distributed deep learning platform. In Proceedings of
the 23rd Annual ACM Conference on Multimedia
Conference,MM, pages 685–688. ACM, 2015.
[39] J. Ortiz, M. Balazinska, J. Gehrke, and S. S. Keerthi.
An empirical analysis of deep learning for cardinality
estimation. CoRR, abs/1905.06425, 2019.
[40] B. Parno, J. Howell, C. Gentry, and M. Raykova.
Pinocchio: Nearly practical verifiable computation. In
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP, pages
238–252. IEEE Computer Society, 2013.
[41] D. Peng and F. Dabek. Large-scale incremental
processing using distributed transactions and
notifications. In 9th USENIX Symposium on
Operating Systems Design and Implementation, OSDI,
pages 251–264. USENIX Association, 2010.
[42] Y. Peng, M. Du, F. Li, R. Cheng, and D. Song.
FalconDB: Blockchain-based collaborative database.
In Proceedings of the International Conference on
Management of Data, SIGMOD, pages 637–652.
ACM, 2020.
[43] B. M. Platz, A. Filipowski, and K. Doubleday.
Flureedb: a practical decentralized database.
Whitepaper, 2017.
[44] P. Ruan, G. Chen, A. Dinh, Q. Lin, B. C. Ooi, and
M. Zhang. Fine-grained, secure and efficient data
provenance for blockchain. PVLDB, 12(9):975–988,
2019.
[45] P. Ruan, G. Chen, T. T. A. Dinh, Q. Lin, D. Loghin,
B. C. Ooi, and M. Zhang. Blockchains and distributed
databases: a twin study. CoRR, abs/1910.01310, 2019.
[46] P. Ruan, A. Dinh, Q. Lin, M. Zhang, G. Chen, and
B. C. Ooi. Revealing every story of data in blockchain
systems. ACM SIGMOD Record, special issue for
SIGMOD Research Highlight Award, 2020.
[47] S. T. V. Setty, V. Vu, N. Panpalia, B. Braun, A. J.
Blumberg, and M. Walfish. Taking proof-based verified
computation a few steps closer to practicality. In
Proceedings of the 21th USENIX Security Symposium,
pages 253–268. USENIX Association, 2012.
[48] Y. Sheng, A. Tomasic, T. Sheng, and A. Pavlo.
Scheduling OLTP transactions via machine learning.
CoRR, abs/1903.02990, 2019.
[49] R. Sinha and M. Christodorescu. Veritasdb: High
throughput key-value store with integrity. IACR
Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2018:251, 2018.
[50] R. Taft, I. Sharif, A. Matei, N. VanBenschoten,
J. Lewis, T. Grieger, K. Niemi, A. Woods, A. Birzin,
R. Poss, P. Bardea, A. Ranade, B. Darnell, B. Gruneir,
J. Jaffray, L. Zhang, and P. Mattis. Cockroachdb: The
resilient geo-distributed SQL database. In Proceedings
of the International Conference on Management of
Data, SIGMOD, pages 1493–1509. ACM, 2020.
[51] S. Wang, T. T. A. Dinh, Q. Lin, Z. Xie, M. Zhang,
Q. Cai, G. Chen, B. C. Ooi, and P. Ruan. Forkbase:
An efficient storage engine for blockchain and forkable
applications. PVLDB, 11(10):1137–1150, 2018.
[52] W. Wang, M. Zhang, G. Chen, H. V. Jagadish, B. C.
Ooi, and K. Tan. Database meets deep learning:
Challenges and opportunities. SIGMOD Record,
45(2):17–22, 2016.
[53] D. D. Wood. Ethereum: A secure decentralised
generalised transaction ledger. 2014.
[54] S. Wu, Q. Li, G. Li, D. Yuan, X. Yuan, and C. Wang.
ServeDB: Secure, verifiable, and efficient range queries
on outsourced database. In 35th IEEE International
Conference on Data Engineering, ICDE, pages
626–637. IEEE, 2019.
[55] Y. Wu, J. Yu, Y. Tian, R. Sidle, and R. Barber.
Designing succinct secondary indexing mechanism by
exploiting column correlations. In Proceedings of the
International Conference on Management of Data,
SIGMOD, pages 1223–1240. ACM, 2019.
[56] C. Xu, C. Zhang, and J. Xu. vchain: Enabling
verifiable boolean range queries over blockchain
databases. In Proceedings of the International
Conference on Management of Data, SIGMOD, pages
141–158. ACM, 2019.
[57] Y. Yang, S. Papadopoulos, D. Papadias, and
G. Kollios. Authenticated indexing for outsourced
spatial databases. VLDB J., 18(3):631–648, 2009.
[58] Z. Yang, E. Liang, A. Kamsetty, C. Wu, Y. Duan,
P. Chen, P. Abbeel, J. M. Hellerstein, S. Krishnan,
and I. Stoica. Deep unsupervised cardinality
estimation. PVLDB, 13(3):279–292, 2019.
[59] C. Yue, Z. Xie, M. Zhang, G. Chen, B. C. Ooi,
S. Wang, and X. Xiao. Analysis of indexing structures
for immutable data. In Proceedings of the
International Conference on Management of Data,
SIGMOD, pages 925–935. ACM, 2020.
[60] C. Zhang, C. Xu, J. Xu, Y. Tang, and B. Choi.
Gem2-tree: A gas-efficient structure for authenticated
range queries in blockchain. In 35th IEEE
International Conference on Data Engineering, ICDE,
pages 842–853. IEEE, 2019.
[61] H. Zhang, G. Chen, B. C. Ooi, K. Tan, and M. Zhang.
In-memory big data management and processing: A
survey. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data
Engineering, TKDE, 27(7):1920–1948, 2015.
[62] J. Zhang, Y. Liu, K. Zhou, G. Li, Z. Xiao, B. Cheng,
J. Xing, Y. Wang, T. Cheng, L. Liu, M. Ran, and
Z. Li. An end-to-end automatic cloud database tuning
system using deep reinforcement learning. In
Proceedings of the International Conference on
Management of Data, SIGMOD, pages 415–432.
ACM, 2019.
[63] Y. Zhang, D. Genkin, J. Katz, D. Papadopoulos, and
C. Papamanthou. vSQL: Verifying arbitrary SQL
queries over dynamic outsourced databases. In IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP, pages
863–880. IEEE Computer Society, 2017.
[64] Y. Zhang, J. Katz, and C. Papamanthou. Integridb:
Verifiable SQL for outsourced databases. In
Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, pages
1480–1491. ACM, 2015.
[65] Z. Zhang, X. Chen, J. Li, X. Tao, and J. Ma. HVDB:
a hierarchical verifiable database scheme with scalable
updates. Journal of Ambient Intelligence and
Humanized Computing, 10(8):3045–3057, 2019.
